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“The Cold War was a 45-year-long Gray Zone Struggle.”1 – General Joseph L. Votel 
I. What is the Gray Zone? 
WHAT IS THE GRAY ZONE? 
 Votel, General Joseph L. USA, Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, USA (Ret.) and Will 
Irwin. “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone.” JFQ 80, (1st Quarter, 2016). National 
Defense University Press http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-
View/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-gray-zone/  
General Votel provides an analytical look at what gray zones are and the primary role of 
SOF in gray zone operations. Considering that gray zone operations are meant to be 
low-profile, limited footprint and typically avoid direct, conventional conflict they are a 
fertile ground for SOF operations.  Gray zones are not limited to precision strikes or 
fighting through proxies, but employ influence operations and “political warfare.”  
General Votel continues to discuss the doctrine behind Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
operations, providing examples from WWII to current times, and looks at what would be 
considered a victory in a gray zone operation.    
SSI “Outplayed-Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone.” U.S. Army War College, June 7, 
2016. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1325  
“In-short, threats emerging from the gray zone have a decidedly disruptive effect on 
strategic risk calculations. Often, the risk associated with action and inaction appears to 
be equally high and unpalatable. “   
This report seeks to describe what the gray zone is and evaluate the United States’ 
capabilities of operating in the gray zone and countering other nations that excel in gray 
zone actions. Conventional and traditional strategy means and methods cannot be 
applied to gray zone challenges.  The report predicts that the U.S. will continue to face 
constant resistance and that it will mainly occur within the parameters of the gray zone.  
In order to properly counter these actions, the report recommends changes in policy, 
strategy, capabilities, operational plans and adaptation.      
 
                                                          
1 General Joseph L. Votel, USA, Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, USA (Ret.) and Will Irwin. “Unconventional 
Warfare in the Gray Zone.” JFQ 80, (1st Quarter, 2016). National Defense University Press,  102. 
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-gray-
zone/  
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Gray zone challenges are not a new occurrence.  They may have had different 
terminology previously, but the actions are the same with the added benefit of modern, 
easily available, technology. The author argues that conventional warfare has become a 
rarity whereas gray zone conflicts are the norm. The pressing concern is that being the 
strongest military conventionally no longer guarantees victory or control over particular 
situations.  The U.S. spends close to $600 billion a year on defense but states with less-
robust spending abilities and non-state actors can successfully conduct operations in the 
gray zone. While other states have more ambiguity of operations, the U.S. need not 
become frustrated with gray zone operations.  While the tools and abilities are already 
present for the U.S. to operate better in the gray zone, the author recommends that 
improvements be made in the “organizational, intellectual and institutional models” in 
order to succeed.   
Brands, Hal. “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.” FPRI, February 5, 2016. 
http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/  
Gray zones in a sense encompass the activities that a state or non-state actor will 
conduct in order to reap the most benefit from without having enough blatant or 
flagrant clear-cut violation of an international standard resulting in them being held 
accountable and being punished militarily.  However, the all-encompassing everything 
between peace and war definition of the gray zone can lead to misclassification of 
conflict.  The author advises not to put China’s island building program and the Islamic 
State’s terror campaign under the same heading.  Furthermore, he examines the 
slippery nature of Gray Zone conflicts and how they can simultaneously in many ways be 
detrimental and beneficial.  
HYBRID WARFARE 
Hoffman, Frank. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for 
Policy Studies, Virginia 2007. 
http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_01
08.pdf  
Frank Hoffman describes hybrid warfare (a part of Gray Zone warfare in itself) as a “full 
range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics 
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and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and 
criminal disorder.” Hoffman provides an overview of what Hybrid warfare is, along with 
its origins and development and its potential impact. Hybrid warfare is not solely the 
province of state actors nor is it relegated to non-state groups.  Hezbollah is used in 
Hoffman’s writing as an example of hybrid warfare in that it uses a multitude of 
conventional, irregular, and terror tactics together in a dangerous mixture. 
Wither, James K. “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare.” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no. 
2 (Spring 2016): 73-87, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1784582336?accountid=322. 
This article covers the increasing focus on and analysis of hybrid warfare.  It come more 
into the public eye after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and entered into general 
policy discussions after that. Pre-2014 occurrences of hybrid war are evaluated and a 
return to the Russian invasion of Crimea is made.  The concept of hybrid war itself is 
dissected, in that the terminology used is different outside of western countries but the 
concept itself is the same.  In conclusion, the author cautions that labels and theories 
are not as important as adaptive strategy and planning that can more effectively 
counter modern warfare.   
COUNTERMEASURES 
Freier, Nathan P., et. al. “Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, A Report 
Sponsored by the Army Capabilities Integration Center in Coordination with Joint Staff J-
39/Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Branch.” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies 
Institute. June 7, 2016. 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1325 
U.S. competitors pursuing meaningful revision or rejection of the current U.S.-led status 
quo are employing a host of hybrid methods to advance and secure interests contrary to 
those of the United States. These challenges employ unique combinations of influence, 
intimidation, coercion, and aggression to incrementally crowd out effective resistance, 
establish local or regional advantage, and manipulate risk perceptions in their favor. So 
far, the United States has not come up with a coherent countervailing approach. It is in 
this gray zone where the United States and its defense enterprise face systemic 
challenges to U.S. position and authority. Gray zone competition and conflict present 
fundamental challenges to U.S. and partner security and, consequently, should be 
important pacers for U.S. defense strategy. 
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Coffman, MAJ Sean, MAJ Rob Shumaker, and MAJ Jeff Givens. “Perception is Reality: SOF in the 
Gray Zone.” Small Wars Journal / Naval Postgraduate School. June 2016. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/perception-is-reality-sof-in-the-gray-zone 
This thesis examines two case studies of special operations forces (SOF) use in the gray 
zone -- in Somalia in 1992-1993 and the Philippines in 2000-2015. Using the 
bureaucratic politics model as a framework and evaluating players, decision games, and 
outcomes, the choice to employ SOF is replayed and outcomes are evaluated in an 
empirical light. 
Kay, Larry. “Managing the Gray Zone is a Gray Matter Challenge.” Small Wars Journal. July 27, 
2016. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/managing-the-gray-zone-is-a-gray-matter-
challenge 
This paper promotes an alternative approach to address problems in the gray zone, 
which is to adopt a generative or systemic solution to ways in which to develop 
strategies to manage gray zone competition by adapting officer career and education 
tracks to create a more operationally and intellectually excellent officer corps. The gray 
zone is a competition of ideas, and managing the gray zone requires intelligent 
management of our intellectual capital, our gray matter. 




By fully leveraging civilian power while embracing a small-footprint yet enduring 
forward military presence, political warfare is politically, economically, and 
diplomatically sustainable. The synchronized whole-of-government application of forms 
of Unconventional Warfare, in support of Security Sector Assistance, diplomatic 
engagement, economic measures, and cyber considerations, constitutes the twenty-
first-century “employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to 
achieve its national objectives. Various solutions to leverage political warfare in 
response to gray zone conflicts include developing doctrine, developing strategies, and 
embracing the human domain. By establishing political warfare strategies, designating a 
lead organization to coordinate and synchronize efforts at the national and deployed 
echelons, and leveraging SOF Special Warfare and Surgical Strike capabilities, this blend 
of a civilian-led Political Warfare campaign with SOF elements will lead to a fully 
integrated response to gray zone conflicts. 
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Echevarria II, Dr. Antulio J. “Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. 
Military Strategy.” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. April 4, 2016. 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1318 
So-called gray zone wars are not new, but they have highlighted shortcomings in the 
way the West thinks about war and strategy. This monograph proposes an alternative to 
the U.S. military’s current campaign-planning framework, one oriented on achieving 
positional advantages over rival powers and built around the use of a coercion-
deterrence dynamic germane to almost all wars as well as to conflicts short of war. The 
aim is to provide military strategists with a vehicle for thinking about out-positioning 
rival parties rather than merely subduing them though kinetic force. By re-orienting our 
thinking in terms of positioning, the author argues that we will find ourselves better 
prepared to coerce or deter our competitors, two essential competencies for operating 
in the gray zone. 
II. Proxy Warfare 
IRAN: LEBANON AND SYRIA 
Nadimi, Farzin. “Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani Proxies: In Syria and Beyond?” Washington 
Institute For Near East Policy. Policywatch 2677. August 22, 2016. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-afghan-and-pakistani-
proxies-in-syria-and-beyond 
As part of its renewed effort to export the Islamic Revolution through armed proxies, 
Tehran has been recruiting and training Afghan and Pakistani fighters for Syria’s 
battlefields, thereby giving them invaluable experience for potential future campaigns in 
other regional countries. 
Pollak, Nadav. “The Transformation of Hezbollah by Its Involvement in Syria.” Washington 
Institute For Near East Policy. No. 35. August 2016. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote35-
Pollak-2.pdf 
The reasoning behind Hezbollah’s Syrian involvement is detailed as well as its scope and 
the characteristics of the group’s activity since then. Hezbollah’s domestic support, 
regional ambitions, and future prospects are explored in depth. 
Cragin,  R. Kim. “Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy.” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 38 no. 5 (March 25, 2015). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1018024  
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Syria has served as a proxy battleground for a number of different groups, both state 
actors and irregular.  What was once Jabhat al-Nusra was fighting for Al-Qaeda Central, 
whereas Hezbollah, various Shiite militias, and the Quds forces are all fighting on behalf 
of Iran.   
CHINA:  
MARITIME MILITIAS OVERVIEW 
Erickson, Andrew S., and Conor M. Kennedy. “Irregular Forces at Sea: Not ‘Merely Fishermen’-
Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia.”  CIMSEC, November 2, 2015. 
http://cimsec.org/new-cimsec-series-on-irregular-forces-at-sea-not-merely-fishermen-
shedding-light-on-chinas-maritime-militia/19624  
This article describes China’s use of merchant and fishing vessels to disrupt and impede 
naval traffic in the South China Sea.  The “maritime militia” as it is referred to consists of 
workers from the maritime industry and fishermen that are specifically trained by the 
Chinese government and deployed in situations where overt naval action would have to 
high of a risk for backlash.  These militia groups have been trained to fulfil multi-role 
operations all with the assumed protection of still being classified as a civilian vessel.   
SANYA CITY 
---------“China’s Daring Vanguard: Introducing Sanya City’s Maritime Militia.”  CIMSEC, 
November 5, 2015. http://cimsec.org/chinas-daring-vanguard-introducing-sanya-citys-
maritime-militia/19753  
The opening part of a multi-part series, this article looks at one particular maritime 
militia, that of Hainan Province.  This particular group has been an integral part of 
China’s maritime arsenal and with a more aggressive posture being undertaken as of 
late, they have the potential to play an even greater role. It is strongly advised not to 
underestimate these irregular forces and China’s will to use them as a tool to 
circumvent existing FONOPS.  The official name of this militia is the Sanya Fugang 
Fisheries Co., Ltd. It is comprised mostly of local fishermen and has been at the fore of 
China’s area denial and fleet harassment activities around the Spratly Islands.  The 
article continues on to describe several incidents in which this maritime militia was 
deployed for the aforementioned purposes.      
BAIMAJING PORT 
---------“Trailblazers in Warfighting: The Maritime Militia of Danzhou.” CIMSEC, February 1, 
2016. http://cimsec.org/trailblazers-warfighting-maritime-militia-danzhou/21475  
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT- Inquiries to CIWAG at USNWC  ciwag@usnwc.edu. 
10 | P a g e  
 
This article continues the report on the Hainan Island maritime militia’s, this time with a 
focus on the Baimajing Fishing Port on the northwestern shore of the island. This 
particular groups has served as the basis in military usage of civilian fishing fleets and is 
a model for other maritime militias.  The origins, activities, current and future role of the 
militia out of the Baimajing port is detailed along with how they are striving to work 
even closer with their militia counterparts.    
TANMENHARBOR 
--------- “Model Maritime Militia: Tanmen’s Leading Role in the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal 
Incident. CIMSEC, April 21, 2016. http://cimsec.org/model-maritime-militia-tanmens-
leading-role-april-2012-scarborough-shoal-incident/24573  
The Tanmen Fishing Harbor and its militia is featured I this article.  The Tanmen militia 
often received a higher level attention due to its frequent encounters with foreign 
vessels.  It has been a premier unit since its founding and has received encouragement 
by Chinese President, Xi Jinping to expand and improve its equipment and areas of 
operation.  The article continues with a timeline of incidents featuring the Tanmen 
militia, starring in 1985.  One particular incident, Scarborough Shoal, between the 
Tanmen militia and the Philippine Navy  is presented in detail. The article concludes by 
showing the increasing level of government support for the Tanmen militia based on the 
multiple visits to the group from government officials. 
------“From Frontier Frontline: Tanmen Maritime Militia’s Leading Role Pt .2” CIMSEC, May 17, 
2016. http://cimsec.org/frontier-frontline-tanmen-maritime-militias-leading-role-pt-
2/25260  
The second article focusing on the Tanmen maritime militia offers two more incidents in 
which this force was utilized to accomplish military and political goals.  In addition to the 
activities of the group, its leadership and organizational structure are also presented.   
COMMAND STRUCTURE 
Erickson, Andrew S., and Conor M. Kennedy. “Directing China’s ‘Little Blue Men’: Uncovering 
the Maritime Militia Command Structure.” AMTI, September 11, 2015. 
https://amti.csis.org/directing-chinas-little-blue-men-uncovering-the-maritime-militia-
command-structure/  
The Chinese maritime militias, mainly composed of fishing fleets, have become serious 
impediments to foreign vessels and a frequent tool of the Chinese government. They 
have served as an elite force in a wide set of supportive, defensive and to some degree, 
offensive actions.  Their command structure falls simultaneously within the local military 
and the corresponding government partner.  The mission goals are decided higher up 
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while direct leadership occurs in the local People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFD), 
however, their direct command structure can change from mission to mission.  
COUNTERMEASURES 
------ “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again.” 
National Interest, July 6, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/countering-chinas-
third-sea-force-unmask-maritime-militia-16860 
The Maritime Militia fulfills a variety of roles spanning the spectrum of peacetime 
coercion and wartime confrontation. This includes providing first-hand and the most up-
to-date intelligence to the navy during peacetime and providing the best logistical tasks 
such as supplying food and water during wartime. Maritime Militia capabilities are 
poised to expand further as Beijing’s desire to “win without fighting” through calibrated 
South China Sea operations growth. 
USE OF KURDS AND SYRIAN GROUPS IN PROXY WARFARE 
Thornton, Rod. “The Kurds as Proxies in Iraq and Syria: A Problematic Relationship for Western 
Powers.” Sustainable Security, April 20, 2016. 
https://sustainablesecurity.org/2016/04/20/the-kurds-as-proxies-in-iraq-and-syria-a-
problematic-relationship-for-western-powers/ 
 Native to the region, the Kurds are an ideal candidate in the fight against ISIL as a 
Western proxy as they are numerous, of a warrior-caste, and politically acceptable to 
Western audiences. The Kurds have proven themselves to be the most effective against 
ISIL in both Syria and Iraq and therefore, both groups have gained support from the 
United States. The caveat here is that the KDP in Iraq and the YPD in Syria are on 
conflicting sides ideologically and are both also fighting for what is in their individual 
best interests. Factor in Turkey’s vested interest in keeping their local Kurdish group, the 
PKK, at bay, the use of Kurds as proxies in Syria and Iraq makes for an increasingly 
complex situation.    
UNITED STATES USE OF PROXIES 
Ford, Robert S. “U.S. Policy Toward Syria.” U.S. Department of State. October 31, 2013. 
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/216163.htm 
 U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford provided testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in 2013 regarding the U.S. policy towards Syria. The U.S. policy is 
to support the moderates in the opposition and to push forward on a political solution. 
Heras, Nicholas A. “From the Bottom, Up: A Strategy for U.S. Military Support to Syria’s Armed 
Opposition.” Center for a New American Security. April 2016. 
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 This policy recommendation suggests that the United States’ effort to arm the moderate 
Syrian rebels should be accompanied by working with the rebels to join forces with 
other moderate fighters to build a cohesive, moderate armed opposition institutions. 
These institutions will become the center of gravity in their respective regions as they 
marginalize or defeat ideological extremist organizations, ultimately being brought 
together to form larger civil-military structures and govern the predominantly Sunni 
rebel-ruled areas inside of Syria. These regional structures can then interact with the 
remnants of the Assad regime and its loyalist forces to work toward achieving a long-
term political solution to the Syrian civil war, such as a federalized Syria. While this 
approach may seem complex and difficult to execute, there are already examples inside 
Syria, especially in the south near the Jordanian border, where American strategy to 
support the armed opposition has had the most success. 
TURKEY’S CONCERN OVER USE OF KURDISH FORCES 
Issa, Philip. “Syria’s Kurds: An embattled US Ally in a Complex Civil War.” AP. August 25, 2016. 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1c6682e6682d4f809d67b1bcdfcec20e/syrias-kurds-
embattled-us-ally-complex-civil-war 
 Turkey, displeased with the recent successes of Syrian Kurds, has entered the Syrian 
conflict, sending tanks across the border to fight ISIL and demand the Kurds retreat from 
their recently seized territory. The tensions between Turkey and the Kurds pit a NATO 
ally against the most effective U.S. military proxy in Syria. The article further outlines 
how the Syrian Kurds battled in the early stages of the conflict with competing forces 
and ultimately made the correct political move to align with the group of U.S.-backed 
Arab fighters known as the Syria Democratic Forces, putting themselves on the good 
side of the United States.  
TURKEY AND RUSSIA 
Bacik, Gökhan. “Turkey and Russia’s Proxy War and the Kurds.” The German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, January 21, 2016. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey-and-
russias-proxy-war-and-kurds 
 The policies of Turkey and Russia in the Middle East are mutually detrimental, especially 
in Syria, where the dynamics of confrontation has almost generated a proxy war 
between the two states, while the Kurds are becoming the critical third actor indicative 
of a proxy war. Turkey’s ultimate goal of the Syrian conflict is to prevent the creation of 
an autonomous Kurdish region along its border and Russia has propped up the Kurds in 
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT- Inquiries to CIWAG at USNWC  ciwag@usnwc.edu. 
13 | P a g e  
 
Syria as partners against radical groups and to confront and punish Turkey for shooting 
down the Russian jet.  
 
THE UNRELIABLE NATURE OF PROXY WARFARE  





 Proxy warfare is not always the most reliable means to an end, but it does provide the 
opportunity for a state to advances its political goals without having to directly commit 
its armed forces, which a much larger backlash or even lead to all out war.  However, 
these individual groups being utilized still have their own agendas and are willing to 
cooperate only as long as it further advances their own cause. Jaysh al Tahrir, a group 
falling under the political umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (which  receives material 
support from the U.S.) and the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) which is the lead 
group of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which is also receiving  U.S. support have clashed 
regarding territory.  Jaysh al Tahrir is closely tied to several Turkish-backed Islamist 
groups and has taken two towns from the YPG (which captured them back from ISIS) in 
order to prevent them from gaining any more ground nearer to the Turkish border.  The 
YPG is of particular concern to Turkey due to it being the Syrian branch of the PKK.   
Chulov, Martin. “Turkey’s Syria Offensive Shows how Each Party is Fighting its Own War.” The 
Guardian, September 2, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/02/turkey-syria-offensive-each-party-is-
fighting-its-own-war-kurds-us-isis 
 Turkey sent tanks and troops into Syria at the end of August with a stated goal of going 
after ISIL in the border town of Jarabulus; however its primary, unspoken goal was to 
stop the Kurds - supported by the United States - from gaining any more territory in 
northern Syria. While all three parties public primary objective is to stop ISIL, each party 
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III. State Actors  
Russia 
RUSSIAN MARITIME  
COERCION AND PROVOCATIONS 
Hicks, Kathleen., Andrew Metrick, Lisa Sawyer Samp and Kathleen Weinberger. “Undersea 
Warfare in Northern Europe.” CSIS International Security Program. July 2016. 
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/160721_Hicks_UnderseaWarfare_Web.pdf  
Russian undersea activity has reached a level it has not been at since the end of the Cold 
War.  A more aggressive Russia has utilized submarine deployments in other nations’ 
territorial waters, particularly in those of Scandinavian countries that are on the fence 
regarding NATO, as a form of intimidation, coercion and area denial.  This tactic allows 
Russia to increase its theoretical area of control and accomplish its political goals 
without escalating to direct conflict. In addition, it announces that Russia is willing to 
advance its will while other nations are required to be cautious and defensive.  The 
report continues after its initial look into Russia’s goals by then evaluating its equipment 
and capabilities followed by suggestions on how NATO nations can counter a resurgent 
Russia.   
MEDITERRANEAN 
Altman, Jonathan. “Russian A2/AD In the Eastern Mediterranean: A Growing Risk.” Naval War 
College Review 69 no. 1. (Winter, 2016). 
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/4ac8b59c-4634-44b3-af06-
dee0203d6c67/Russian-A2-AD-in-the-Eastern-Mediterranean---A-Gro.aspx 
This report looks at the potential for Russia to utilize similar anti-access and area-denial 
techniques in the Mediterranean as it does in the Baltic and North Sea. The Russian 
Black Sea Fleet is one of Russia’s larger fleets and it outnumbers the U.S. Sixth Fleet in 
the region. The presence of Russian forces in the Mediterranean strengthens Moscow’s 
end game of pushing the U.S. from the region.  This added military support could allow 
Russia to present themselves as the dominant power especially if backed by appropriate 
political maneuvers.  A “decoupling” of allies could be achieved if Russia exploited 
Greece’s economic crisis, gave additional arms to Egypt and pushed closer ties with 
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Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian government.  With Russia adding its fleet into the 
mix, it can potentially box the U.S. out of the Middle East on land, sea and politically.          
 
RUSSIA IN UKRAINE  
HYBRID WAR AND MEDIA 
Koffman, Michael and Matthew Rojansky. “A Closer look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War.’” Kennan 
Cable no.7, April 2015. Kennan Institute. 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no7-closer-look-russias-
hybrid-war  
This article closer analyzes the common view of Hybrid Warfare and  Russia’s actions 
during the Crimean invasion and the invasion of Eastern Ukraine. Russia extensively 
utilized destabilizing media broadcasts and propaganda to prepare for and solidify their 
gains in each offensive.  Russia’s media campaigns are set on a larger goal or removing 
what it sees as Western dominance of the media and to question those perspectives, 
information is used as a form of national power.  The authors argue that the focus 
should not be on trying to classify such events but in learning how to counter a state like 
Russia using a wide range of abilities to implement its will.  
GREEN MEN TACTICS 
Altman, Dan. “The Long History of ‘Green Men’ Tactics - And How They Were Defeated.” War 
On The Rocks. March 17, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/the-long-history-of-
green-men-tactics-and-how-they-were-defeated/  
In both Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Russia’s signature tactic has been the use of “Green 
Men,” or deniable forces, which has in turn become a central part of gray zone conflicts. 
Although highlighted by Russian conflicts in the last two years, deploying deniable forces 
is a recurring tactics throughout history. 
NON-LINEAR WARFARE 
Kasapoglu, Can. “Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive 
Control.” NATO Defense College, Research Division. No. 121, November 2015. 
http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/Articles/russia's%20renewed%20Military%2
0Thinking.pdf  
Western view of hybrid warfare focuses on any occurrence being “multi-modality” 
whereas the Russian strategy concurring with this heading is more fluid and focusing on 
achieving an end goal as opposed to fitting into specific parameters. 
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DESTABILIZING WITH CIVIL UNREST  
Whitmore, Brian. “How To Manufacture A War.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. August 26, 
2016. http://www.rferl.org/content/how-to-manufacture-a-war/27947359.html 
Recordings of conversations between Kremlin aide Sergei Glazyev and proxies in Ukraine 
highlight the specific instructions he gave them to instigate unrest in Donetsk, Kharkiv, 
Zaporizhzhya, and Odessa as early as February 2014 -- before Russia had even annexed 
Crimea. In turn, Russia had managed to stir up enough unrest in certain pockets of 
eastern Ukraine to justify its state and non-state military support for separatists. 
CULTURE WARFARE/COERCION 
Krekό, Péter., Lóránt Győri, Jakub Janda, Ondřej Kundra, Grigorij Mesežnikov, Juraj Mesík, 
Maciej Szylar and Anton Shekhovtsov. “The Weaponization of Culture: Kremlin’s 
Traditional Agenda and the Export of Values to Central Europe.” Political Capital 
Institute, August 4, 2016.http://www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-
content/uploads/PC_reactionary_values_CEE_20160727.pdf  
Russian “culture warfare” has been and is being utilized not only to promote itself as the 
champion of traditional values and demonize the West but to export these pro-Russian/ 
“traditional” values to neighboring countries.  These values campaigns, if successful will 
spark a desire in ethnic Russian abroad and their Slavic counterparts to embrace Russian 
political ideals and guidance. These values more importantly serve to bolster the growth 
of political groups within these neighboring countries that espouse illiberal, anti-
democratic and authoritarian views that are more in line with the Russian government’s 
initiatives. A combination of outside events, organizations, Russian language and foreign 
language media, and the availability of Russian cultural and pro-Kremlin materials are 
utilized to spread this cultural coercion.  A particularly effective impact of this campaign 
is increased support for Russia in far-right political parties active in Baltic and Eastern 
European governments.       
PROPAGANDA 
Paul, Christopher., and Miriam Matthews. “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda 
Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It.” RAND Corporation. 2016. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html 
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The Russian propaganda model is high-volume and multichannel, and it disseminates 
messages without regard for truth. It is also rapid, continuous, and repetitive, and it 
lacks commitment to consistency. Traditional counter-propaganda approaches will likely 
be inadequate in this context. More effective solutions can be found in the same 
psychology literature that explains the surprising success of the Russian propaganda 
model and its messages. 
Chen, Adrian. “The Agency.” New York Times Magazine. June 2, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html 
From a nondescript office building in St. Petersburg, Russia, an army of well-paid “trolls” 
has tried to wreak havoc all around the Internet -- and in real-life American 
communities. 
Walker, Shaun. “Salutin’ Putin: inside a Russian troll house.” Guardian. April 2, 2015. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-
house 
Former workers tell how hundreds of bloggers are paid to flood forums and social 
networks at home and abroad with anti-Western and pro-Kremlin comments. 
PROXY POLITICAL GROUPS 
Lutsevych, Orysia. “Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups in the Contested 
Neighbourhood.” Chatham House. Russian and Eurasia Programme. April 2016. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-
04-14-agents-russian-world-lutsevych.pdf 
Anxious about losing ground to Western influence in the post-Soviet space and the 
ousting of many pro-Russia elites by popular electoral uprisings, the Kremlin has 
developed a wide range of proxy groups in support of its foreign policy objectives. 
Russia employs a vocabulary of ‘soft power’ to disguise its ‘soft coercion’ efforts aimed 
at retaining regional supremacy. This network of pro-Kremlin groups establish 
alternative discourses to confuse decision-making where it is required, and act as 
destabilizing forces by uniting paramilitary groups and spreading aggressive 
propaganda. 
Vojtiskova, Vladislava., Vit Novotny, Hubertus Schmid-Schmidsfelden, and Kristina Potapova. 
“The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU.” 
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. July 2016. 
http://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publication-files/russia-gongos.pdf 
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This paper sheds light on organizations operating in Europe that are funded by the 
Russian government, whether officially or unofficially. These include government-
organized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs), non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and think tanks. Their goal is to shift European public opinion towards a positive 
view of Russian politics and policies, and towards respect for its great power ambitions. 
These organizations use soft power as a vehicle to rely more on coercion than 
attraction. This paper reveals the broad range of methods and institutions that the 
Russian government is using to influence decision-makers and public opinion in the EU. 
COUNTERMEASURES 
De Liedekerke, Arthur. “The rise of paramilitary groups in Central and Eastern Europe.” New 
Eastern Europe. January 18, 2016. http://neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-
commentary/1862-the-rise-of-paramilitary-groups-in-central-and-eastern-europe 
Europe has seen a surge in popularity of paramilitary units in countries directly affected 
or alarmed by the violence in Ukraine and the large influx of refugees. While some 
groups operate in parallel with regular military units, others have strikingly different 
motives and far-right ideologies. 
Lucas, Edward and Peter Pomeranzev. “Winning the Information War: Techniques and Counter-
strategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe.” Center for European 
Policy Analysis / Legatum Institute. August 2, 2016. 
https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2715 
This report analyzes the impact of Russian disinformation by drawing on dozens of case 
studies seeing the employment of Russian information warfare tools as well as the 
political forces, civil society actors, businesses, and public figures who use them. It also 
looks at several examples of Russian policies which have been enacted using 
disinformation: interventions in decision-making in Lithuania; fomenting insurrection in 
eastern Ukraine; general denigration of Latvia’s international reputation; developing 
native pro-Kremlin media outlets in the Czech Republic and Estonia; and supporting far-
right and ultranationalist movements and sentiments in Poland. The report concludes 
with a 13-point recommendation plan to target Kremlin disinformation, strengthen 
media in democracies, and educate audiences. 
RUSSIA IN SYRIA 
McDermott, Roger. “Russia’s Application of Military Power in Syria.”. Eurasia Daily Monitor 13 
no. 41. March 1, 2016. Jamestown Foundation 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45149&tx_ttnews%5Bb
ackPid%5D=7&cHash=e541e940817a6e05fd3be42885792206 
UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT- Inquiries to CIWAG at USNWC  ciwag@usnwc.edu. 
19 | P a g e  
 
Russia’s military operations in Syria are, in essence, about applying asymmetric warfare 
approaches through testing and rehearing the use of limited military power to alter the 
balance of power into Bashar al-Assad’s favor. Information warfare, escalation 
dominance, anti-access/area denial, air defense protection, and training and equipping 




Ryan, Missy., and Thomas Gibbons-Neff. “Navy Patrol Ship Fires Warning Shots at Iranian Vessel 
in one of Several Confrontations.”  Washington Post, August 25, 2016.   
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/08/25/u-s-navy-calls-
high-speed-approach-by-iranian-ships-dangerous-harassment/  
Iranian small boats have utilized swarming tactics to harass and impede U.S. Navy 
vessels. Several additional recent Iranian provocation/area denial actions have occurred.    
IRAN DURING THE IRAQI INSURGENCY 
OVERVIEW 
Beehner, Lionel., and Greg Bruno. “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq.” Council on Foreign Relations, 
March 3, 2008. http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-involvement-iraq/p12521 
This report by the Council on Foreign Relations breaks down how Iran is involved in Iraq 
and it provides a concise and inclusive overview of the situation. The report covers Iran’s 
military, religious, economic, and social involvement in Iraq as well as addressing Iran’s 
motivations for getting involved in Iraq. 
FUNDS AND MONETARY SUPPORT 
“Military Official: Iranian Millions Funding Insurgency.” CNN, September 28, 2006. 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/28/iraq.iran/ 
 A senior U.S. military official is quoted saying a Shiite militia involved in the warfare 
between Sunni and Shiites in Iraq has received millions of dollars and an assortment of 
weaponry from Iran in order to retain some influence with the victorious group in Iraq.  
WEAPONS AND MATERIAL 
Roggio, Bill. “Evidence of Iran Supplying Weapons, Expertise to Iraqi Insurgents.” Long War 
Journal, February 11, 2007. 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/02/evidence_of_iran_sup.php 
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Captured Iranians confirmed that Iran had been smuggling sophisticated explosive 
devices and weaponry to multiple Iraqi insurgent groups. Markings on the explosively 
formed projectiles and mortars made U.S. suspicious of Iranian involvement but the 
capture of Iranians in Irbil possessing documents confirmed suspicions. The article also 
quotes an unnamed defense official that the activities must be coming from the senior 
levels of the Iranian government as the operational commander of the Al-Qods brigade, 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps specialized force that reports to Iran’s Supreme 
Leader, was among those captured. 
O’Keefe, Ed., and Joby Warrick. “Weapons Prove Iranian Role in Iraq, U.S. says.” Washington 
Post, July 5, 2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/war-zones/weapons-prove-
iranian-role-in-iraq-us-says/2011/07/05/gHQAUnkmzH_story.html 
Senior U.S. officials are quoted saying that Iranian backed militias in Iraq are using more 
sophisticated weapons than in the past to target U.S. troops and military installations in 
Iraq. Forensic testing performed on weapons used in deadly attacks on U.S. troops 
proved that the weapons are coming from Iran as insurgents are making no effort to 
remove the weapons identification numbers proving their Iranian origin. 
TRAINING 
Gourley, Scott R. “MNF-I outlines Iranian Support for Iraqi ‘Special Groups’.” Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, March 20, 2008. https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1176536 
Spokesperson for the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) indicated that there was 
evidence that proves Iraqi operatives are being trained inside of Iran and sent back into 
Iraq and form small cells that are carrying out much of the violence against Coalition and 
Iraqi security forces. He notes that the intention of these special groups is to keep Iraq 
just destabilized enough that Iraq would not pose a military threat to Iran. 
“Iran Training Iraqi Insurgent Groups, General Says: Quds Force Provides Training, Funds and 
Arms.” Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, July 3, 2007. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/190021082?pq-origsite=summon 
This article outlines the extent of Iranian support to Iraqi insurgents including the 
involvement of Hezbollah officials. The article further highlights that the Quds Force, an 
elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, provides up to $3 million per month to 
fund insurgent operations. 
ASSERTING INFLUENCE 
Cochrane, Marisa. “Special Groups Regenerate.” The Institute for the Study of War, August 29, 
2008. http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/IraqReport11.pdf 
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 This report examines the patterns and trends of the Iranian-backed militias known as 
Special Groups. The Coalition and Iraqi Forces were able to force the leaders of these 
groups back into Iran, it is likely that they will return to Iraq to rebuild their networks 
and adopt new tactics. 
Felter, Joseph and Brian Fishman. “Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means”.” 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 13, 2008. 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Iranian-Strategy-in-
Iraq.pdf 
This paper details the objectives, methods, and expansiveness of the Iranian attempts 
to affect policy and politics in Iraq through both historical context and strategic 
motivation for Iranian actions.  
China 
CHINA’S ISLAND BUILDING 
“Island Tracker.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) https://amti.csis.org/island-
tracker/  
The Island Tracker, developed and maintained by the Asia Maritime Transparency  
Initiative,  provides a database of satellite imagery and brief summaries regarding the 
reclamation and development of reefs and by China and Vietnam.   
REASONS FOR ISLAND DEVELOPMENT 
Dutton, Peter. “A Maritime or Continental Order for Southeast Asia and the South China Sea?” 
From an Address at Chatham House, London, U.K. February 16, 2016.  Featured in Naval 
War College Review 69, no. 3. (Summer, 2016), 5-13. 
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/b3e85931-7139-49f9-8d93-6d5b53826a37/A-
MARITIME-OR-CONTINENTAL-ORDER-FOR-SOUTHEAST-ASIA.aspx   
Peter Dutton, director of the U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 
presents potential reasons behind and the ramifications of China’s Island building in the 
South China Sea.     
THE THREE WARFARES 
Kania, Elsa. “The PlA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares.” China Brief 16, no. 13 
(August 22, 2016). Jamestown Foundation. 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45723&tx_ttnews%5Bb
ackPid%5D=7&cHash=229badbe854a0bdac91aaf401e3f9744  
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China is attempting to portray the U.S. as the aggressor in what is being called the 
“militarization” of the South China Sea.  China claims that it is the one upholding 
maritime law whereas the U.S. is using an aggressive policy.  The author describes how 
China is conducting this campaign through the “Three Warfares,” which are: Public 
Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare. 
IV. Cyber 
CYBER TARGETING  




Cyber-based attacks were not a revolutionary occurrence when they entered the public 
eye during the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia. Cyber operations are not restricted to 
professional, state-sponsored groups, but are widely utilized by irregular groups and 
individuals.  While these actors are not necessarily answerable to any authority, 
legitimate state actors are.  This piece evaluates the application of international law in 
terms of cyber-targeting by state actors. Major aspects that are taken into effect include 
what the target is, the weapon (or software) used, and any collateral damage.  
See also the : the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare from the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), Tallinn, Estonia. 
https://ccdcoe.org/research.html    
ATTACKS ON FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
Groll, Elias. “Spear Phishing In Tehran.” Foreign Policy. August 9, 2016. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/09/spear-phishing-in-tehran/ 
Researchers have found evidence that Iranian hackers, responsible for the cyber attacks 
on Saudi Aramco computers and American banks in retaliation for cyber attacks on 
Iranian nuclear centrifuges, are now using those same tools against the more 
defenseless human rights groups and civil societies as a key tool in the regime’s attempt 
to maintain power. 
 THEFT OF GOV. EMPLOYEE DATA 
Adams, Michael. “Why the OPM Hack IS Far Worse Than You Imagine.” Lawfare. March 11,  
2016. https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-opm-hack-far-worse-you-imagine 
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The U.S. Office of Personnel Management data breach was exposed in June 2015 and 
involves the greatest theft of sensitive personal data in history. But, to date, neither the 
scope nor the scale of the breach has been fully aired. 
POLITICAL SYSTEM ATTACKS 
Rojansky, Matthew. “Tinker Tailor Soldier Hacker: The Russian Factor in the DNC Email 
Scandal.” Kennan Institute. July 27, 2016. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/tinker-
tailor-soldier-hacker-the-russian-factor-the-dnc-email-scandal  
This article looks at the motives behind the Russian hacking of the DNC emails.  The 
author speculates that the end goal was to show the vulnerability of the American 
political system. Russia suspected that the U.S. influenced events in Russian elections, so 
Putin wants to show that it can return the favor.  
“Internet Trolling as a hybrid warfare tool: the case of Latvia.” NATO Strategic Communications 
Centre of Excellence. February 2016. http://www.stratcomcoe.org/internet-trolling-
hybrid-warfare-tool-case-latvia-0 
Russia is deploying social media trolls in an attempt to affect political change across 
Europe.  They are often identified by their poor grammar, repetition of content, and IP 
addresses. These paid Russian bloggers flood the Internet with comments favorable to 
Russian interests, paranoid conspiracy theories against the West and destabilizing 
messages aimed at Russian speaking members of Baltic countries.  This study provides 
an in-depth look at Russia’s online political and cultural coercion campaign. Latvia is a 
frequent target and therefore is the focus of this study.   
AGAINST OPPOSITION 
Hulcoop, Adam., Bahr Abdul Razzak, John Scott-Railton, Katie Kleemola, and Matt Brooks. 
“Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection.” Citizen Lab. August 2, 2016. 
https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/ 
This report describes an elaborately staged malware operation with targets in the Syrian 
opposition. The operators use a range of techniques to target Windows computers and 
Android phones with the apparent goal of penetrating the computers of well-connected 
individuals in the Syrian opposition. The operators seem comfortable with Iranian 
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Blanford, Nicholas. “How off-the-shelf drones are changing war in Syria and Lebanon.” Christian 
Science Monitor. August 16, 2016. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2016/0816/How-off-the-shelf-drones-are-changing-war-in-Syria-and-Lebanon 
A recent video purportedly shows a mini-drone operated by Hezbollah dropping 
munitions on Syrian rebels in northern Syria, highlighting the ease with which militants 
can turn a mini-drone into a weapon. 
ONLINE PROPAGANDA AND RECRUITMENT 
Koerner, Brendan I. “Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War.” Wired. April 2016. 
http://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat 
 
ISIL is as much a media conglomerate as a fighting force. ISIL innovates its branding 
across social media platforms to crowdsource its distribution, inspire real-world action, 
and steer conversations on- and off-line. 
 
Frenkel, Sheera. “Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About How ISIS Uses The Internet.”  
Buzzfeed. May 12, 2016. https://www.buzzfeed.com/sheerafrenkel/everything-you-
ever-wanted-to-know-about-how-isis-uses-the-i 
 
As ISIL continues to attract supporters from around the globe, the group has found a 
way to exploit any online platform that exists, from launching cyber attacks to 
publishing encryption advice to luring recruits through dating sites. 
 
Berger, J.M. “Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy.” CTC 
Sentinel 8, No. 10. October 23, 2015. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/CTCSentinel-Vol8Iss1036.pdf 
 
This article examines the methodical approach ISIL takes to target and recruit its 
prospects online. 
 
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS  
Kruithof, Kristy, Judith Aldridge, David Decary Hetu, Megan Sim, Elma Dujso, and Stijn Hoorens. 
“Internet-Facilitated Drug Trade.” RAND Corporation. August 2016. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1607.html 
The Internet’s potential role in facilitating the drug trained first gained mass attention 
with the rise and fall of the Silk Road in October 2013. Today, there are around 50 so-
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called cryptomarkets and vendor shops where anonymous sellers and buyers find each 
other to exchange illicit contraband. 
